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175. Allow an opt-in to skip the GitLab no_one_allowed pipeline-variable check ​

Date: 2026-11-17

Amends: ADR 0131

Status ​

Accepted

Context ​

Amends, but does not supersede, ADR 0131: no_one_allowed stays the default and the recommendation.

ADR 0131 requires GitLab's ci_pipeline_variables_minimum_override_role to be no_one_allowed before fullsend delivers runnable typed jobs. The check runs in install, converge, the trigger dispatch gate, and the CLI activation path. Some adopters cannot apply that setting. Their teams queue pipelines manually with pipeline variables every day, so the setting blocks their own work.

Relaxing the setting has a real cost. This is GitLab's problem, not fullsend's: every job in the project takes pipeline variables from whoever starts it, whatever the job does. A caller can point CI_API_V4_URL at a host they control. The job identity pin then gives away the job token, the Poller PAT, and a role credential. A BASH_ENV file-type variable can also run the caller's code inside the job before fullsend's script starts. The warning must say this plainly.

This ADR aims to let adopters who cannot use no_one_allowed install fullsend anyway, through an explicit opt-in that fullsend saves and warns about.

Options ​

  • Role threshold (accept owner, maintainer, or developer as the minimum acceptable role). Rejected: the risk does not depend on the role alone, so a threshold adds settings without adding safety.
  • Companion project (run fullsend from a separate project that keeps no_one_allowed). Rejected for now: sub-issues 9632–9635 were closed in favor of an opt-in.
  • External credential gate (the job holds no long-lived credential; a service checks GitLab-signed claims and hands one out). Deferred to its own ADR; too large to bundle with the opt-in.

Decision ​

We add an explicit opt-in to let blocked adopters install fullsend without weakening the default for anyone else. The exact CLI shape is an implementation detail tracked in #9597.

The opt-in is saved, so every later check accepts it instead of refusing again. With the opt-in, fullsend accepts a setting weaker than no_one_allowed and warns, in plain words, what a relaxed setting exposes. Without the opt-in, nothing changes from ADR 0131. no_one_allowed stays the default and the documented recommendation.

Forge scope ​

GitLab only. GitHub needs no equivalent because no one running a workflow can override GITHUB_API_URL or the job token (see ADR 0131's context). Forgejo has no pipeline-variable override mechanism to restrict.

Consequences ​

  • Adopters whose workflow depends on pipeline variables can install and converge without changing their GitLab setting.
  • Anyone at the relaxed role who can run a pipeline on the default branch can read the Poller and role credentials. The warning and the docs must say so, so an adopter's security team knows what they accept.
  • The health check for this setting (#9466) must treat the opt-in as expected, not as drift.
  • A future ADR may make relaxed mode safe through an external credential gate. This ADR does not depend on it.